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Algorithmic regulation 
  
Algorithmic regulation has become a central theme in contemporary policy 
discussions (see generally Yeung 2017). The broader social implications of our 
increasing reliance on algorithms in daily life have attracted considerable 
interest in recent years, especially with the rising awareness of the power of ‘big 
data’ and predictive analytics. One of the most vivid examples is the widespread 
concern about the use of algorithms to manipulate information and therefore 
affect political life, especially at election time, at least since the US elections. In 
the economy, the role of cryto-currencies is seen as an important development, 
in which cryptographic algorithms play a critical role, as is the use of algorithms 
to facilitate the supply and demand of services across the so-called ‘gig economy’.   
 
At the same time, governments have been keen to harness the power of 
algorithms to inform decision making in a range of policy spheres, including the 
use of algorithms to optimise resource allocation decisions, and to do so pre-
emptively, exemplified in the increasing popularity of so-called ‘predictive 
policing’.  Concerns about the need and importance to hold algorithmic power to 
account invariably extends to the role of law generally, and data protection law 
in particular, to secure algorithmic accountability, yet it is far from clear that 
existing mechanisms are up to the task.   
 
In view of the pervasive influence of the algorithm in economic, political and 
social life, the world of regulation scholarship has also become increasingly 
interested in the implications of algorithms for and in regulation. The papers in 
this collection were initially presented during a joint workshop between King’s 
College London’s Centre for Law Technology, Ethics & Society (TELOS) and the 
London School of Economics’ Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (carr) 
held in early July 2017. Professor Helen Nissenbaum from New York University 
was our distinguished international guest. The workshop was organised to bring 
together a range of international scholars from different disciplinary 
backgrounds to discuss emerging themes in algorithmic regulation. This 
collection brings together a revised selection of papers that provided the basis 
for discussion during the workshop.  
 
The workshop funding was provided by carr’s ESRC funded ‘Regulation in 
Crisis?’ seminar series and by The Dickson Poon School of Law, in supporting the 
work of the Centre for Technology, Ethics, Law & Society (TELOS) at King’s 
College London. 
 
Martin Lodge and Karen Yeung 
 
Reference 
Yeung, K. (2017) ‘Algorithmic regulation: a critical interrogation’, Regulation & 
Governance, doi: 10.1111/rego.12158. 
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The importance of regulation of and by algorithm 
 
Martin Lodge and Andrea Mennicken 
 
 
The regulation of and by algorithms has become of growing interest to students 
of regulation, coinciding with the related interest in open and big data. Early 
contributions on the potential implications of the rise of algorithmic regulation 
focused on the interaction between social and technical determinants. These 
discussions considered whether the rise of algorithmic regulation and new 
information technologies represented a fundamental (mostly benevolent) 
change in opportunities for citizens and states (and opportunity structures), 
whilst others pointed to the likely reinforcement of existing power structures 
(such as the detecting powers of states), or the rise of new unregulated and 
private sources of surveillance. Yet others noted the likely complexification 
effects of the use of computerised algorithms in generating new types of 
unintended consequences.  
 
It is therefore unsurprising that algorithmic regulation has become a growth 
industry in the study of changing modes of surveillance (often under the ‘risk-
based’ label) by state actors as well as in the disquisitions on the rise of new 
forms of corporate power, based on the economic value of ‘data’. Relatedly, it has 
given rise to new concerns about resilience and redundancy in view of cyber-
security, in an age of interconnectedness and reliance on communication and 
energy networks. 
 
What, however, can be understood as ‘algorithmic regulation’? Is there 
something clearly identifiable and distinct from other types of regulatory control 
systems that are based on standard-setting (‘directors’), behaviour-modification 
(‘effectors’) and information-gathering (‘detectors’)?  
 
One way to point to distinctiveness is that algorithms can ‘learn’ – and that the 
codes on which these algorithms are ‘set’ and ‘learn’ are far from transparent. A 
second component is the supposedly vast computing power in processing 
information. A third component is the large ‘storage’ capacity that potentially 
allows for comparison and new knowledge creation. A fourth component might 
be the insidious nature in which ‘detection’ does take place: users casually 
consent to highly complex ‘conditions of service’ and are not necessarily in 
control of the way in which their ‘profile’ is being processed.  Similarly, and this 
is a fifth component, behaviour-modification is said to work by using 
architecture and ‘nudges’. In other words, one might argue that algorithmic 
regulation is an extension to existing control systems in terms of their storage 
and processing capacity; they are qualitatively different in that much of the 
updating is performed by the algorithm itself (in ways that are non-transparent 
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to the external observer) rather than based on rule-based programming; and it is 
distinct in its reliance on observation and default-setting in terms of detecting 
and effecting behaviours.  
 
At the same time, the notion of decision making and ‘learning’ by the algorithm 
itself is certainly problematic. No algorithm is ‘unbiased’ in that the initial default 
setting matters, and so does the type of information that is available for 
updating. To maintain ‘neutral’ algorithms might therefore require biased inputs 
so as to avoid highly undesirable and divisive outcomes. Instead, what is called 
here ‘by the algorithm itself’ is that the ways in which these algorithms ‘learn’ 
and what kind of information they process is not necessarily transparent, not 
even to those who initially established these codes. This means that 
understanding the ‘predictions’ of algorithms is inherently problematic; they 
resemble the multiple forecasting models used by hurricane watchers where one 
day’s ‘perfect prediction’ might be completely ‘off’ the following day. 
 
Beyond these general debates about algorithmic regulation, there are a number 
of critical issues for regulation. Firstly, what is the impact of algorithms on 
‘users’? To some extent, one might argue that algorithmic regulation brings in 
new opportunities for users – it generates powerful comparisons that potentially 
grant users greater choice options on the market (and quasi-market) place than 
before. Similarly, algorithmic regulation can also be said to increase the potential 
for ‘voice’: enhanced information can be used for a more powerful engagement 
with users (e.g. users of public services). The threat of ‘choice’ and ‘voice’ might 
make providers of services more responsive to users.  
 
However, as individual experiences disappear into ‘big data’, engagement is 
mediated. This, in turn, points to the requirement that we need to understand 
better the ways in which user experiences are mediated – and through which 
means.1 Different means of mediating such experiences exist – it might be based 
on explicit benchmarking and league-tabling (thereby relying on competitive 
pressures), or it might be based on providing differentiated analyses so as to 
facilitate argumentation and debate, or it might be based on enhanced 
hierarchical oversight. Furthermore, as noted, algorithms are not neutral. They 
are therefore not just mediation tools but are instead of a performative and 
constitutive nature, potentially enhancing rather than reducing power 
asymmetries. In short, the regulation by algorithm calls for the regulation of the 
algorithm in order to address their built-in biases. 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, as regulation via algorithm requires regulation of the 
algorithm, questions arise as to what kind of controls are feasible. In debates 
about the powers of state surveillance (in the context of Snowden), one 
argument has been made that the state’s ‘intelligence’ powers are more 
accountable than those of private corporations. Such a view is controversial, but 
it raises the question as to how state and non-state actors should be held 
                                                        
1 The notion of ‘google knowing’ describes the phenomenon in which the top search results’ 
content is adopted in unquestioned ways. 
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accountable (i.e. reporting standards potentially backed by sanctions) and 
transparent (i.e. allow for external scrutiny). Transparency might also increase 
potential vulnerability to manipulation. Given the transnational nature of much 
corporate activity, it raises also the question of jurisdiction and the potential 
effects of national and regional regulatory standards (such as those relating to 
privacy).  
 
Even if such regulatory oversight powers could be established (among state, 
non-state or para-state bodies), the regulation of the algorithm might also be 
expected to give rise to a new kind of regulatory analyst. Arguably, this means 
that this is the age of the forensic data analyst and programmer rather than the 
lawyer and the economist. Altering regulatory capacities in that way may prove 
challenging in itself. However, it is also likely to be challenging as the analytical 
capacities of the ‘forensic data analyst’ need to be combined with other 
capacities in terms of delivery, coordination and oversight. It also requires new 
types of combinations of analytical capacities; for example, when it comes to the 
regulation of information, it is not just the presentation of particular ‘facts’ that 
requires monitoring, but it is increasingly their visualisation. In the field of 
energy, it requires the combination of engineering and data analysis.  
 
Furthermore, there is the question at what point such regulation of the algorithm 
could and should take place. One central theme in ethical debates has been the 
default setting – algorithms should not be set to make straightforward ethical 
choices, but should be programmed so as to make ‘context-dependent’ choices. 
Such a perspective is problematic as no algorithm can be ‘neutral’. As 
information can emerge and ‘wiped’ or deleted (but not everywhere), and as 
complex information systems generate new types of vulnerabilities, as 
information itself can be assessed in remote (non-intrusive) ways, regulatory 
capacity is required to deal with information in ‘real’ rather than ‘reactive’ time.  
 
The third central issue for the regulation of algorithms is vulnerability to gaming 
and corruption. We define ‘gaming’ as the use of bots and other devices to 
mislead: information flows are generated that might, at first sight, appear as 
‘real’, but, on second sight, reveal that they are generated by artificial means 
and/or are inflated so as to provide greater visibility to some ‘information’ than 
others. This might be related to the use of social media to communicate certain 
messages, or it might be used to enhance the visibility of certain websites on 
search engines. In contrast, corruption is the explicit attempt to undermine the 
functioning of the system rather than its exploitation. This is therefore the world 
of cyber-security and the protection of critical infrastructures (that increasingly 
operate in the cloud without sufficient protocols to deal with ‘black swans’, let 
alone, ‘fancy (or cozy) bears’ (Haba 2017). 
  
In response, it might be argued that regulation by algorithm makes gaming also 
less likely when it comes to oversight. Performance management by target and 
indicator is widely said to suffer from extensive gaming and manipulation (i.e 
‘corruption’). The power of algorithms to deal with information could be said to 
enhance the possibilities of regulators to vet information in unpredictable ways, 
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thereby reducing the opportunities by organisations to game. However, as the 
work by Alex Griffiths and colleagues has shown, assessing complex 
organisations via algorithms remains a difficult undertaking that does not 
necessarily enhance the predictive powers of regulatory oversight.  
 
Beyond these questions of the regulation of algorithmic regulation remains the 
wider concern with ethical questions. As has been demonstrated, artificial 
intelligence devices can quickly turn racist (Devlin 2017; Kleinman 2017) as they 
process embedded information and their explicit and implicit biases. It raises 
issues about the transboundary effects of national (state and non-state) efforts to 
set standards and it also raises issues about the differential interests of users – 
insisting on ‘privacy’ on the one hand, but also demanding ‘ease of use’ on the 
other. Finally, it also raises the ethical question about the nature of public policy: 
what kind of expertise should be prioritised? Table 1 summarises our argument 
about the potential effects of regulation by algorithm.  
 
Table 1: Potential effects of regulation by algorithm 
Increased contrived randomness 
 
+ makes gaming and corruption less feasible as 
regulators can process vast information flows 
rather than rely on key indicators 
 
- Complex and vast information might reduce 
possibility of detecting essential 
information/non-transparency of the 
algorithms means lack of understanding of 
patterns 
 
Increased oversight 
 
+ makes risk-based assessments more likely as 
vast information flows allow for more fine-
grained analysis and bespoke oversight 
 
- Substantially enhances intrusiveness and 
surveillance powers 
Increased rivalry 
 
+ enhances possibility for ranking and 
benchmarking  
 
- Enhances vulnerability to gaming and 
corruption by bots and malware attacks 
Increased mutuality 
 
+ enhances information for informed engagement 
 
- Increases dominance of ‘data analyst’ over 
other kinds of professional knowledge/biased 
conversation 
 
In sum, therefore, the question of how to deal with the regulation of algorithms 
returns us to the underlying normative position established by Harald Laswell in 
his call for an interdisciplinary field of ‘policy analysis’, namely the need for a 
population with knowledge of and in the policy-making process. 
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Algorithms, governance and regulation: beyond  
‘the necessary hashtags’ 
 
Leighton Andrews 
 
The necessary hashtags 
What do you call one thousand lawyers replaced by robots? In this variant of the 
old joke, the answer remains ‘a good start’. But I am writing on the day that the 
Serious Fraud Office has revealed that it recently used algorithmic software to 
review ‘30 million documents at a rate of up to 600,000 a day, whereas a team of 
barristers would previously have processed 3,000’ (Bridge 2017). 
 
At the end of March 2017, the UK Home Secretary was roundly mocked after she 
referred to the need to call on the support of ‘the best people who understand the 
technology, who understand the necessary hashtags’ (Mezzofiore 2017), to take 
action against terrorist messaging and posting on social media and messaging 
platforms. Analysing politicians’ language may not be the best route to evaluating 
the readiness of governments to address complex issues such as the regulation of 
algorithms, artificial intelligence and machine learning, but it is one indicator of 
the challenges that face those seeking to advance political understanding and 
build a platform for action. It will be hard to build public confidence if senior 
policymakers are not seen as credible explainers of the challenges. Other 
politicians may have deeper understanding. Angela Merkel was very specific 
when she said of Facebook and Google in October 2016: 
 
The big internet platforms, via their algorithms, have become an eye of a 
needle, which diverse media must pass through to reach users … These 
algorithms, when they are not transparent, can lead to a distortion of our 
perception, they narrow our breadth of information (BBC News 2016). 
 
Meanwhile, President Obama was comfortable enough to guest-edit Wired 
magazine and to explain why ‘government will never run the way Silicon Valley 
runs’ (White House 2016), at a technology ‘Frontiers’ event last autumn – but the 
digital challenges now facing governments go well beyond the development of 
citizen-friendly services on public digital networks. A growing range of challenges 
driven by advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning are going to 
require an expanded digital confidence and capacity from politicians and 
regulators. ‘Algorithmic accountability’ doesn’t easily lend itself to a manifesto 
pledge, but across a range of sectors it is becoming an increasingly important 
issue – and it is not clear that the political, administrative or regulatory capacity 
has evolved to address the challenges. 
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Algorithmic harms 
Perhaps it is helpful to consider at the outset what are the dangers against which 
we are trying to protect ourselves? Why have algorithms come into such public 
prominence over recent years? First, we have well documented examples of 
algorithmic bias, in which judgements on individual futures – employment, 
eligibility for loans, likelihood of imprisonment – are determined by algorithmic 
choices which have in-built human errors or conscious or unconscious biases. 
Second, we have clear examples of algorithmic manipulation, in which 
judgements about, for example, news, information or advertising, are constructed 
on the basis of data collected on individuals and used to channel what is 
presented according to inferred preferences. Third, we have perceived or actual 
algorithmic lawbreaking, in which algorithms are apparently deliberately 
constructed to deceive lawmakers and regulators, for example, in terms of 
emissions controls or traffic management, or attempts at price-fixing. Fourth, we 
have growing evidence of algorithm usage in propaganda, from disinformation 
campaigns by unfriendly countries to election campaign bots. Fifth, there is the 
issue of algorithmic brand contamination and advertising fraud where major 
brands have found their advertising placed alongside hate speech or terrorist 
material, or where human interaction with the advertising is proven to be less 
than reported as bots are upping the claimed strike-rate. Sixth, there is what I call 
algorithmic unknowns – the question of how machine learning means algorithms 
are becoming too complicated for humans to understand or unpick; it is in this 
arena also that the concern about general AI taking anthropomorphic forms and 
following the long-standing themes of ‘technics-out-of-control’ also emerges 
(Winner 1977).  
 
I don’t pretend that is a comprehensive list, but it will suffice as an illustration of 
the challenges that now face and will face regulators across a range of fields. 
 
Regulating the algorithm  
I was first involved in attempts to regulate algorithms over 20 years ago. Working 
at the BBC, we sought to regulate the new gatekeeping technologies of digital 
television – what were commonly known as ‘set-top boxes’ – driven by 
conditional access systems whose algorithms determined what content viewers 
could access, depending on the subscriptions they had paid (see Levy 1997). 
These were simple algorithms – and we were actually seeking to regulate 
corporate behaviours, rather than the algorithm itself. Today, it seems that there 
are three kinds of behaviour which call into question the need for regulation, 
crudely summarised as: 
 
 Human behaviour (initial encoding of, development of training data for 
and management of algorithms) 
 Corporate behaviour (proprietary algorithms and their deployment, 
management and governance) 
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 Algorithmic behaviour (the black box issue, machine learning) 
Andrew Tutt (2016, see Table 1 below) has suggested a qualitative scale of 
algorithmic complexity which may be helpful in assessing the nature of risk to 
society and how that might be managed or regulated: 
  
Table 1: A possible qualitative scale of algorithmic complexity (Tutt 2016: 107) 
 
Algorithm type Nickname Description 
Type 0 ‘White box’ Algorithm is entirely deterministic (i.e. the algorithm is merely a 
pre-determined set of instructions. 
Type 1 ‘Grey box’ Algorithm is non-deterministic, but its non-deterministic 
characteristics are easily predicted and explained. 
Type 2 ‘Black box’ Algorithm exhibits emergent proprieties, making it difficult or 
impossible to preduct or explain its characteristics. 
Type 3 ‘Sentient’ Algorithm can pass a Turing Test (i.e. has reached or exceeded 
human intelligence). 
Type 4 ‘Singularity’ Algorithm is capable of recurive self-improvement (i.e. the 
algorithm has reached the ‘singularity’) 
 
It is important to stress, lest, in the light of public attention that has recently been 
given to use of algorithms by Google, Facebook, Volkswagen and Uber in particular, 
algorithms are thought to be ungovernable, that regulatory authorities do have 
some experience of regulating algorithms. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 
to take but one example, in the field of high frequency trading (HFT; see FCA 
2014).1 Regulation is difficult, and never perfect, but possible. 
 
What are the policy instruments under consideration? 
The recent proposed inquiry by the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee (2017), into ‘Algorithms in decision-making’, suspended by the 
General Election, drew a significant amount of evidence. A simply policy 
instrument analysis of the evidence submitted shows the following proposals 
(see Table 2). 
 
So a range of technical, governance, regulatory, legislative or institutional 
proposals were outlined. Notable was the absence of any serious fiscal proposal. 
Meanwhile Bill Gates (Waters 2017) has called for the taxation of robots in order 
to replace the payment of income tax lost to automation, though as Floridi (2017) 
has pointed out it is not clear how this might be done. First there would be the 
issue or how to define a robot; second, given that certain kinds of robotic device 
have been in use in automated factories for some time, the question of 
retrospection would also arise; third, it is not yet clear that automation will 
necessarily lead to a new displacement of jobs. Income tax may be a policy blind 
alley. 
 
                                                        
1 See also FCA’s ‘Content of proposed MAR 5 & MAR 5A – systems and controls for algorithmic 
trading on MTFs and OTFs’. <https://www.fca.org.uk/mifid-ii/8-algorithmic-and-high-frequency-
trading-hft-requirements>  
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Table 2: Policy instrument analysis of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee evidence on 
algorithms in decision making 
 
 
However, there are other ways of using fiscal instruments where in the past, 
these have been used as ways of mitigating risk: the variable charges on car tax 
dependent on their emissions of noxious gases, for example. Radio and television 
licences have been means of funding developments in new technologies (for 
example, the colour TV licence as an additional licence fee payment in the 1970s). 
Public goods such as radio-communications spectrum and independent 
terrestrial television franchises have been subject to auction. Is there a case for 
creating new fiscal instruments for algorithms, artificial intelligence and machine 
learning? For example, to limit insecure devices connected to the Internet of 
things, should there be a connectivity tax? Or to as insurance against harms by 
‘home-companion’ robots, or for first generation driverless vehicles, should these 
come on-stream, or to raise additional funds from algorithmically-driven Internet 
intermediaries to fund other media?  
 
Conclusion: an oversight institution? 
There have been a variety of proposals for some kind of oversight institution: an 
AI Watchdog (Sample 2017), a Machine Learning Commission (Mulgan 2016), or 
in the US context, an FDA for Algorithms (Tutt 2016), or a National Algorithm 
Safety Board (Macaulay 2017). The recent Royal Society and British Academy 
report (2017) on Data Governance has reinforced this. A single regulatory or 
ethics body may be appropriate in each jurisdiction, though there will be a need 
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for international coordination. Additionally, there will be sector-specific 
challenges on algorithmic regulation, and a single AI watchdog is unlikely of itself 
to have the time or capacity address all issues, and could be a heavy-handed 
instrument, or worse, a delay to innovation. It may be part of the solution, as an 
umbrella, over-arching body with supervisory and advisory roles, but not the 
whole solution as sectoral regulators need to strengthen their capacity in this 
area. Indeed, as I said in written evidence to the House of Commons Culture, 
Media and Sport inquiry into Fake News, some of these issues raise questions 
which cross the boundaries of sectoral regulators (Andrews 2017).  
 
We have a new government with a manifesto commitment to creating an expert 
Data Use and Ethics Commission ‘to advise regulators and parliament’; a 
regulatory framework for data and the digital economy; ‘a sanctions regime to 
ensure compliance’ and a power for an industry-wide levy on social media 
providers and communications services providers to support awareness and 
preventative activity. So we are, it seems, moving beyond ‘the necessary 
hashtags’. 
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Evaluating predictive algorithms 
 
David Demortain and Bilel Benbouzid 
  
 
Algorithms and models for automated analysis of data are developed with a 
great deal of promises in mind, about precision, completeness, up-to-datedness, 
optimisation and anticipatory capacity gained by organisations employing these 
technologies. Many of these promises and expectations will, of course, be denied 
in practice, and algorithms may even produce consequences in decision that are 
adverse to the values which are meant to drive the regulatory decision in the 
first place. 
 
One first possible form of regulation applying to algorithms, thus, could be some 
kind of product-based regulation of quality, applying quality standards to these 
(software) products, just like regulatory regimes were invented over time for 
other products and technologies through the course of innovation. Standards 
could thus define what algorithms or the IT systems, by which they are 
deployed, should have. Firstly, one would think they should have a certain level 
of transparency about what’s in the system: the core algorithm itself, or the 
code. A second approach could be to adopt the kind of instruments that has 
generalised under the generic regime of ‘risk regulation’, in particular, those 
that that seek to evaluate or assess, ex ante as well as ex post, the effects 
associated with a product or technology, including not very probable effects.  
 
The first form of ‘product’-based regulation may perhaps be considered more 
appropriate, in the light of problems of the opacity and the ‘black-boxed’ nature 
of algorithms, and general difficulties in accessing the heart of the IT systems 
and their codes. But the second form of regulation may be at once more difficult 
and more likely. More difficult, first, because the standards or benchmarks 
against which one judges that an algorithm produces a systematic effect, and 
that this effect is negative or adverse, are generally not easy to establish; there 
is a basic problem in knowing that an algorithm produces an effect on 
something that we generally cannot know otherwise. Algorithms, by definition, 
are systems that produce knowledge or treat data at scales and levels of 
complexity that no other body of knowledge or experience can access. There 
may be experience available to judge that an algorithm gets things wrong, but 
then the question becomes the availability of this experience, its codification, 
and how open and honest the process of evaluating or validating the algorithm 
against this experience will be. More likely, however, because the structure of 
the industry in which algorithms are developed, and the competition within that 
industry between commercial and academic or public developers may be, in 
some cases, conducive to the emergence of forms of testing and comparative 
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trials of algorithms, on which more formal regulatory systems could build. I 
draw from the area of predictive policing to illustrate these issues. 
 
Crime analysis tools have proliferated in the last decades,1 the more innovative 
or recent development being crime series analysis tools, that are also termed 
‘predictive policing’ tools – a label that many reject, preferring instead to stick to 
a more modest phrase of crime analysis. 
 
Among those tools that aim to predict crime, PredPol has received the most 
attention, because of its claims to be able to predict crime, and its commercial 
success too. PredPol is a software that claims to be able to do more than spatial 
analysis and identification of ‘hot spots’, to extrapolate from existing data, with 
precision, territories to patrol to avert crime. PredPol as a company does not 
easily lend access to its algorithm or to the data on which it is used, and thus 
does not help ‘audit’ or validate the predictions that it makes. It is well known, 
however, that they took inspiration from an algorithm developed for the 
purpose of predicting earthquake aftershocks. The research that influenced 
PredPol is that of David Marsan, a professor in the earth science laboratory at 
the University of Savoie, in Chambéry, France, and a specialist in the study of 
earthquake aftershocks.  
 
The algorithm that he developed was introduced into the PredPol system, on the 
basis of the principle that crimes are subject to ‘after-crimes’ in the same way as 
earthquakes are followed by aftershocks. In other words, PredPol imported a 
geo-physical theory of ‘loading’ of earthquake potential, into the analysis of 
crime, through the notion of ‘contagion’. Crime occurrence can be predicted by 
jointly calculating hotspots, and a potential of contagion from one crime to the 
next. The particularity of this method is that it is a very ‘lean’ model, with a 
minimal number of parameters in the equation. The quality of the predictions 
depends on the theory of contagion, rather than on the completeness of 
parameters and of the data entered into the system. 
 
Figure 1: Predicting occurrence  
 
 
                                                        
1
 Smart Policing Initiative Quarterly, Newsletter no. 7, Springer 2013. 
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So PredPol generates maps of the territories to patrol, algorithmically governing 
the work of police officers in the field, in the name of scientific accuracy. In 
many American cities that have purchased the tool, police officers can check 
these predictions directly on a tablet, or work with print-outs of the maps with 
150m x 150m cells highlighted. 
 
Figure 2: Mapping territories 
 
 
 
It is by definition nearly impossible to ‘validate’ the predictions made by the tool 
or assess their impact on crime minimisation. Predictions are nearly 
unfalsifiable. On the one hand, they are very unlikely to bring police officers to 
the site of a crime, and help them catch the offender red-handed. At the same 
time, this does not discourage PredPol from arguing that their tool is predictive. 
The argument they use is that, quite simply, the presence of a police patrol on a 
territory will discourage crime offenders. This is hard to prove too. So the 
predictions by the tool are difficult to test and verify, as is the overall marketing 
claim of PredPol. An evaluation could be made of the quality of predictions, e.g. 
by collecting feedback from police officers about their experience with the tool, 
and their knowledge of the evolution of the territories in question and crime 
patterns, as they observe it. Or a correlation between the use of PredPol 
predictions and the evolution of crime in a set of cities, in which it is in use, 
could be computed. In both instances, PredPol seems to discourage this kind of 
evaluation, by protecting its core and lean algorithm as a trade secret. 
 
An evaluation of the predictions was made, as a sort of sociological experiment 
by liaising with David Marsan, whose work on earthquake predictions PredPol 
took  its inspiration. Marsan reconstituted the model that PredPol uses, and 
downloaded crime data for the city of Chicago, to generate predictions and 
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compare them with those of PredPol (that had released predictions for the same 
city in a 2014 publication). The conclusion of this informal validation exercise 
was that: 
 
These results cast strong doubts on the capacity of the models 
proposed here to outperform simple hotspot maps obtained by 
smoothing, for the dataset analysed. The triggering contribution to 
the occurrence of future events is small (it accounts only for 1.7 % 
for the best model). Accounting for memory in the system therefore 
can only provide a very modest contribution to the effectiveness of 
the prediction scheme. […] More importantly, it is assumed that the 
dynamics of the process stays the same over time. Possible non-
stationarity of the process is thus clearly an issue, as it will prevent 
the use of past information to predict the future.2  
 
Marsan identified problems with the theory of contagion and its contribution to 
the prediction of crime as opposed to other parameters, but also to the 
assumption of stability/stationarity in crime events over time and finally, with 
the fact that predictions are performative as they trigger decisions that will 
affect the environment being predicted. For example, burglars respond to 
changes in policing strategies induced by predictions. So, ‘unlike natural 
processes like earthquakes, analyses like the one presented here could 
therefore have the ability to modify the observed process, making it more 
difficult to, correctly predict future events’.3 
 
The performances of PredPol have got to be understood better, but only in this 
informal manner unless or until more information is provided. Other ways of 
evaluating algorithms and their performances involve cross-city exchanges of 
experience, through more or less formalised contacts between police forces of 
various cities that use the commercial service, mainly after dissatisfaction with 
the service. The more critical development in terms of public evaluation of 
algorithmic performance came through the development of competitors of 
Predpol. HunchLab’s own predictive system contrasts with PredPol in many 
ways. Firstly, HunchLab was established by a not-for-profit startup in data 
sciences, that has developed a range of applications in collaboration with police 
forces and academics. Secondly, it has moderate claims about its core algorithm 
and its pure predictive performance. As its developers argue, prediction is a 
loaded term that deflects from the other part of the phrase predictive policing. 
While they are confident in the quality of their predictions, they emphasise that 
their tool is one that helps design patrol allocations to minimise preventable, 
foreseeable harm. Thirdly, and relatedly, the algorithm itself is not conceived of 
as a major trade secret. Very little time has been spent on developing it. Much 
more time, however, was spent on defining the complex set of data and 
                                                        
2 Pers. comm. David Marsan to Bilel Benbouzid, March 2015. 
3 Ibid.  
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parameters to model the environment of policing and crime, so as to best 
predict outcomes within it. They model many more aspects than PredPol, 
including environmental risk factors (presence of bars, prostitution in the area), 
but also weather and moon phases. Lastly, the performance of the prediction is 
not reduced to the validity of the predictions made by the algorithm, as verified 
ex post against actual crime offences measured in the area. The algorithm is 
judged ‘performant’ if and when officers actually trust and use it. To reach this 
level of ‘trust’ in the prediction, HunchLab incorporates in its tool various 
applications for feedback by the police officer, incorporating his or her 
experience in the prediction. 
 
The development of HunchLab is in and of itself the result of an evaluation of 
the performance of the competing tool of PredPol, against which it is 
positioned in the market in multiple ways (commercial/non-commercial; 
predictive/decision-aiding tool etc.). The point here, again, is not whether an 
exercise of testing or validating the algorithm and its predictions actually 
occurs, or if an algorithm is judged wrong or right. The more intriguing point is 
how common evaluative knowledge about what the algorithm does emerges. 
There are many barriers to the production of this evaluation of algorithms, not 
least when algorithms are developed commercially, as part of proprietary 
products and services. This makes it apparently more difficult to produce the 
iterative tests that are necessary to arrive at an objective view of the 
performance of the prediction, and remaining uncertainties such as testing it 
on new territories, or more and varied sets of data, testing it ex post against 
actual crime occurrence, and so on. The various informal, indirect ways in 
which evaluative knowledge has emerged in the above case shows that there is 
potentially a gap here, that is only filled when someone admits the public 
relevance and importance of what the algorithm does, and takes up an 
arguably public role of testing its effects. 
 
Other cases reveal the importance of the industry developing the algorithms, 
and of developers with a greater level of ‘publicness’, in the sense of alignment 
on public values and goals. The algorithms developed to quantitatively predict 
the risk of a toxic chemical, sold to chemicals-regulating agencies and 
businesses regulated by these in the 1990s, only slowly came to be criticised, 
and finally little used, as a small set of academics or scientists working in 
publicly funded health and environment research institutes took on the task of 
systematically investigating the proposed tools, and run them on a variety of 
domains, to produce an estimate of the quality of the prediction and the 
remaining uncertainties. As algorithms were found to be able to reproduce 
experiments in some 20 to 60 per cent of the cases, the claims of their 
developers concerning their accuracy, predictive capacity and utility for 
regulatory decision makers have gradually eroded. In this case, the existence of 
a public industry and profession of toxicological modelling allowed this to 
happen sooner than in the predictive policing area, where most developments 
are delegated to an emerging data science industry. Both cases, comparatively, 
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pose the question of the institutional structure enabling the evaluation of the 
knowledge offered by algorithms. 
 
 
David Demortain and Bilel Benzouid, Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire Sciences 
Innovations Sociétés, Paris, France. 
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The practical challenges of regulating the quality of  
public services with algorithms 
 
Alex Griffiths 
 
 
This paper details some of the real-world challenges of implementing 
algorithmic approaches to regulating the quality of public services. Using the 
health and higher education sectors as case studies, it demonstrates the 
differences between theory and practice, followed by a short outline of the 
conditions necessary for algorithmic approaches to succeed, and a short 
conclusion which may form the basis of further discussion.  
 
Risk-based regulation and the use of algorithms  
Risk-based regulation is built upon the allocation of regulatory resource in 
proportion to the risks posed to the regulator’s objectives (Black 2005; Rothstein 
et al. 2006b). It ostensibly provides practitioners with a means with which to 
‘maximise the benefits of regulation while minimising the burdens on regulatees 
by offering “targeted” and “proportionate” interventions’ (Rothstein et al. 2006a: 
97).  
 
For public services, this means the ability to lighten or eliminate inspections for 
low-risk providers, leaving them free to prosper, whilst using the resource saved 
to conduct inspections of high-risk providers and quickly eliminate or prevent 
any poor practice, all at the same or reduced cost to the taxpayer. In theory, 
everybody wins.  
 
Prioritising regulatory resource is, of course, not a new challenge (Pontell 1978). 
Risk-based approaches are intended to replace the implicit prioritisation of 
resource previously conducted behind closed doors with the explicit 
determination of risk through assessment frameworks (Black 2005: 4).  
 
Regulators rarely publish comprehensive details on how they calculate risk; 
however, it is possible to loosely place their calculative approaches into three 
categories:  
 
a. Typically utilised by regulators developing their first risk-assessment 
approach, regulatees can be assigned one of a small number of risk 
categories by means of a simple, and often contextual, rules-based 
assessment. 
b. Data-informed prioritisation tools use algorithms to weight and 
aggregate an often large number of metrics selected a priori by experts 
to generate a risk rating and or report.  
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c. Data-driven approaches make use of machine-learning techniques to 
identify, weight and aggregate useful metrics and develop optimal 
statistical models without human interference.  
 
The risk ratings generated by these algorithms may either be reviewed by 
humans who make the final prioritisation decision, or may automatically 
prioritise activity. Real-world examples of data-informed and data-driven 
algorithmic approaches are detailed below.  
 
Algorithms and the Care Quality Commission (CQC)  
The CQC is responsible for regulating the quality of care provided at all 30,000 
health and social care organisations in England. Regulating such a large number 
of organisations providing often vital and/or dangerous services to vulnerable 
users has resulted in CQC fully embracing a risk-based approach.  
 
In the NHS, there is a wealth of data including: waiting times, mortality and 
readmission rates, staff surveys, patient surveys, patient-led estates 
assessments, infection rates, finance and governance measures, staff 
qualifications, staffing levels and hours worked, whistleblowing reports, and 
safety notifications.  
 
The complex ‘Quality and Risk Profiles’ (QRPs) were developed with expert 
statistical input to aggregate approximately 1,000 indicators mapped to one of 
16 care ‘outcomes’. Each indicator had three individual weightings and a score 
on a seven-point scale, and these weighted scores were in turn aggregated to 
generate a risk score for each of the 16 ‘outcomes’ on an eight-point scale. Each 
QRP was updated nine times a year.  
 
Despite the wealth of data and (relatively) complex algorithm, QRPs were not 
well regarded by inspectors and, more importantly, failed to identify risks to the 
quality of care (Walshe and Phipps 2013). The median risk score preceding an 
inspection findings of ‘minor non-compliance’ was actually lower than the 
median risk score preceding an inspection finding of compliance.  
 
Following criticism in the Francis Inquiry into the scandal at Mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust, CQC made significant changes including its risk tool. 
‘Intelligent Monitoring’ was designed to be far simpler and, following 
consultation with the sector, 150 indicators which it was felt would best identify 
risks to the quality of care were selected for the tool (CQC 2013). Each indicator 
was categorically scored as either ‘No evidence of risk’, ‘Risk’, or ‘Elevated risk’ 
and aggregated with equal weight (CQC 2014).  
 
The revised and far simpler ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ tool was, however, also 
unable to successfully identify risks to the quality of care. Indeed, the regular 
scoring and aggregation of 150 expertly chosen indicators was actually wrong 
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more often than it was right. It would have been marginally better for the CQC to 
do the exact opposite of what the tool suggested (Griffiths et al. 2016).  
 
Therefore, even with arguably more data than any other regulator in the UK, and 
two quite different approaches, CQC was unable to successfully automate the 
collection and scoring of data to prioritise its activity. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean it cannot be done. It may be the case that CQC have not yet 
found the right algorithm – something which could be determined via machine 
learning. This approach was adopted by the Quality Assurance Agency.  
 
Algorithms and the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA)  
The QAA are responsible for assuring quality standards in UK higher education. 
Later than others to adopt the risk-based approach, the 2011 Higher Education 
White Paper ‘Students at the Heart of the System’ called for QAA to adopt:  
 
… genuinely risk-based approach, focusing QAA effort where it will 
have most impact and [to] explore options in which the frequency – 
and perhaps need – for a full, scheduled institutional review will 
depend on an objective assessment of a basket of data, monitored 
continually but at arm’s length  (BIS 2011: 3.19)  
 
Unlike the development of CQC’s tools, a machine-learning approach was used to 
devise the optimal model for QAA using thousands of indicators including 
confidential QAA not available to the public and 600 sets of financial accounts 
purchased from Companies House. Despite having the outcome of all QAA 
inspections, an extremely comprehensive data set covering ten years and 
machine-learning techniques, no model could be developed that successfully 
predicted the outcome of QAA reviews. Put simply, there was no relation 
between the available data and the outcome of QAA reviews. Even with perfect 
hindsight, the reviews could not be successfully prioritised based on the data 
(Griffiths 2017).  
 
Why can’t the data drive effective regulation?  
It has therefore been empirically demonstrated that algorithmic regulation is not 
guaranteed to be successful. Whilst it is not possible to identify the specific 
reasons for the failure in the algorithmic regulation, it is possible via the above 
investigations and further work carried out as part of a recent King’s College 
London project to identify potential contributing factors:  
 
a. Data may be poor quality due to human error, poor information 
systems of varying degrees of ‘gaming’ incentivised by the growing use 
of indicators in performance management.  
b. Data may be correct but of limited use by the time it can be processed 
and acted upon by the regulator due to its age. This is especially true of 
annual data collections.  
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c. Data may be being misused, for example student satisfaction survey 
results are used as a proxy for teaching quality in spite of the fact 
students may be most happy not being challenged and guaranteed a 
high grade.  
d. Data may be too coarse, capturing data at university- or trust-level may 
average out any signs of variation across the large and complex 
organisations and fail to pinpoint pockets of poor quality.  
e. Inspections findings are inherently constrained by what inspectors can 
see and understand in large, specialist organisations in a short period 
of time.  
f. The outcome of inspections are often over-reductionist, for example 
describing the quality of a multi-billion pound, multi-hospital NHS trust 
with a single word.  
g. Processes being assessed by regulators may have become entirely 
decoupled from the outcomes assessed by data as regulatees are keen 
to demonstrate compliance and pass their ‘ritual of verification’ (Power 
1997).  
h. Data and inspections may simply be assessing different things.  
i. Algorithmic techniques work best when there is a large number of 
data-rich cases so that statistical associations can be found between 
inspection findings and the data on which the probability of those 
inspection findings statistically depend; predictive power may be 
inherently constrained by a limited number of regulatees and 
inspection findings.  
j. Algorithms will struggle to predict the outcome of quality inspections 
when the nature of ‘quality’ is ambiguous, unstable and contested; for 
example, in higher education should university quality be assessed in 
terms of student employability, satisfaction, retention, widening 
participation or A-level tariffs? Even if quality is clearly defined, 
whether an inspector feels it is being provided is inherently subjective 
in fields such as health and higher education.  
 
Conclusion  
If algorithmic regulation can be successfully achieved it offers many benefits 
with few if any drawbacks. Its appeal to government is clear. It ostensibly allows 
them to: reduce the amount of resource they have to invest in regulators 
showing themselves as efficient with taxpayers’ money, be seen to be embracing 
new technologies, prevent or quickly respond to poor quality, and actively cut 
the ‘red tape’ that is burdens good providers.  
For algorithmic regulation to be a success however the real-world problems 
which limit its application must be acknowledged and overcome. To ignore these 
challenges is easy for politicians as successful algorithmic regulation comes with 
all the above benefits and any failings can be blamed on poor implementation by 
the regulator. Moreover, anyone stating it can’t be done runs the very real risk of 
appearing monolithic and open to criticism that the problem is not with 
algorithmic approaches, but with their inability to implement it. Until these 
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problems are acknowledged and addressed, algorithmic regulation of the quality 
of public services will continue to fail and it is the people that regulation was 
designed to protect who will suffer.  
 
It is tempting, as QAA have done, to suggest any problems with algorithmic 
regulation can be sorted by having a panel of experts review the output of any 
risk model and make the final decision (Kimber 2015). This can have its 
advantages; higher education specialists know that low contact hours at the 
University of Oxford result from their individual tuition approach rather than 
neglecting students and can compensate for this. However, humans are prone to 
numerous heuristics and biases which mean these correct interventions are 
outweighed by incorrect interventions (Kahneman 2011).  
 
It has been assiduously demonstrated that experts are, at best, equally as good 
(or bad) at making decisions as simple models (see for example Grove et al. 
2000). Even when experts have access to the output of simple models, they have 
still been shown to perform worse than the model by itself (see for example 
Goldberg 1968; Montier, 2009).  
 
A bad model is not made good by humans interpreting it. As the data and 
technology landscape changes, new opportunities arise which may solve some of 
the problems highlighted in this paper. For example, machines can – with 
significant effort – be taught to classify millions of items of student or patient 
feedback which cannot realistically be read or consistently coded by humans. 
Further, student location and engagement with online learning environment can 
be monitored to give new insight into student engagement with universities.  
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Algorithmic regulation on trial? Professional judgement and the 
authorisation of algorithmic decision making 
 
Jeremy Brice 
 
 
Delegating regulatory decision making to algorithms is, we are often warned, a 
high stakes business. Regulatory decisions such as the determination of risk 
scores or the authorisation of investigation and enforcement action can have far 
reaching consequences for those affected by the courses of action (or inaction) 
that they set in motion. As such, it will be vitally important to ensure that 
algorithms are capable of making ‘sound’ decisions before they are introduced 
into regulatory processes – much as the judgement of human beings is typically 
validated through examination and accreditation before they are empowered to 
act as authorised officers of regulatory bodies. But what counts as sound 
judgement in the field of algorithmic regulation? How is one to tell whether an 
algorithm is ‘performing well,’ or making the ‘right’ decisions?  
 
I was recently invited to tackle these questions when a middle ranking civil 
servant named ‘Daniel’1 approached me at the desk in the headquarters of the UK 
Food Standards Agency (FSA) where I work for three days a week as an 
embedded researcher. Daniel, who is responsible for revising the FSA’s process 
for assigning risk ratings and compliance scores to food businesses and 
classifying them into risk categories (or ‘segments’), explained that he had a 
problem about which he had come to ask my advice. He envisioned that his 
amended risk segmentation process would be partially automated, using 
algorithmic tools to assign businesses to appropriate risk categories without the 
need to subject them to a time consuming inspection. But a troubling question 
had occurred to him over the previous weekend: how would he know, once this 
algorithm had been developed, whether it was assessing risk and segmenting 
businesses correctly? How would he be able to tell whether his automated system 
was assigning the right businesses to the right risk categories? These were 
unfamiliar questions, with which Daniel had not had to grapple before. Did I have 
any suggestions about how the FSA might evaluate whether his new algorithm 
was ‘working well’? 
 
If I was a little confused about exactly what Daniel meant when he talked about 
an ‘algorithm’ in this context, I found his decision to come to me for help in 
evaluating its performance downright perplexing. I am still a newcomer to the 
problematics and politics of algorithmic governance, although this is rarely a 
handicap in my current work on food regulation. The regulators with whom I 
work – the FSA and the Local Authority Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) 
                                                        
1
 A pseudonym to protect this individual’s anonymity. 
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and Trading Standards Officers (TSOs) who are primarily charged with enforcing 
food regulation in the UK – appear to interact with food businesses, and to 
evaluate and regulate the risks which they might pose, largely through 
conventional inspection practices. Officers carrying out inspections determine 
‘intervention rating’ scores which express a business’s level of compliance with 
food law and the magnitude of risk which it might pose to public health by 
assessing whether standardised lists of criteria have been met (for instance by 
taking temperature measurements, observing the hygiene practices of workers, 
and reviewing documentation). As such, the risk ratings and compliance scores 
which decide the frequency of future inspections are simultaneously both 
determined by the formalised logics of standardised inspection protocols and 
produced through the situational application of an inspecting officer’s 
professional judgement and embodied skills.  
 
The role of the latter often leads food businesses to complain that inspectors’ 
decisions lack transparency and consistency, a charge partly responsible for 
provoking the changes to intervention rating and risk segmentation processes 
which Daniel is tasked with overseeing. The FSA has recently committed to 
developing a single centralised register of all food businesses operating in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is envisioned that this database (which at 
present remains an aspiration rather than a reality) will augment the FSA’s 
existing records of inspection results, enforcement outcomes and results of tests 
on food samples with data sourced from other UK government business registers. 
This expanded dataset will then be used to classify (or ‘segment’) food businesses 
automatically into risk categories, helping regulatory bodies to distinguish ‘high 
risk’ businesses requiring immediate inspection from ‘low risk’ ones which may 
safely be inspected less frequently or even exempted from programmes of 
regular inspection altogether. This initiative thus aims to transform a regulatory 
system based on inspections conducted at regular intervals into a data-enabled 
system of what Karen Yeung (2016) might term ‘pre-emptive enforcement’ 
capable of using algorithmic systems to identify, and proactively investigate and 
intervene into, potentially risky businesses in order to prevent violations of food 
law. 
 
Such proposals to use algorithms to assess risk, allocate regulatory resources and 
target intervention and enforcement action have attracted sustained critical 
scrutiny in recent years (for instance Janssen and Kuk 2016; Zarsky 2016). Some 
commentators fear that evacuating human judgement from risk profiling and the 
triggering of enforcement action might disperse responsibility across sprawling 
networks of designers, programmers, data providers and algorithm users – 
preventing victims of erroneous or disproportionate algorithmic judgements 
from locating a responsible party who can be held to account. Indeed, the 
technical complexity of algorithmic systems and their frequent seclusion from 
public scrutiny may render it difficult or impossible to establish the grounds on 
which a decision was made, and thus to determine whether it was correct or not. 
This opacity, combined with the speed with which algorithmic systems act and 
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the difficulty of reasoning with one, may make algorithmic decisions difficult to 
contest or appeal – a particularly worrying prospect given the potential for 
algorithmic systems to reproduce the biases of their designers or training 
datasets with potentially discriminatory results. It is surely important, in light of 
these concerns, to ask on what basis algorithms come to be authorised by 
regulatory actors to judge who is likely to comply with the law and who is likely 
to violate it. Through what tests and trials do algorithms become trusted, to put it 
in Daniel’s terms, to make the right assessment? 
 
It quickly became clear that Daniel had come to my desk already equipped with a 
preferred answer to this question. He proposed to test his risk segmentation 
algorithm for food businesses in a trial group of Local Authority areas over a 
period of perhaps one year. During this trial officers employed by participating 
Local Authorities would carry out a desktop risk assessment on each food 
business within their jurisdiction which fell due for inspection, using the same 
information and risk scoring rules as the algorithmic system. In this way it would 
be possible to compare the algorithm’s assessment of the risk of non-compliance 
posed by each food business, and of whether or not each premises required 
inspection, against the professional judgements offered by Local Authority 
officers. Daniel’s argument was that the FSA would know that the algorithm was 
‘working well,’ even in the absence of comparable inspection records against 
which to test it (due to the introduction of his new risk segmentation process), if 
both algorithm and officers tended to identify the same premises as being high 
risk and in need of inspection. The more similar were the algorithm’s conclusions 
to the judgements of the officers, the better it would be considered to be 
performing. 
 
Daniel’s suggested approach to testing and evaluation suggests something 
potentially interesting about the conditions under which algorithmic calculations 
might become accepted as valid judgements, and even as an acceptable basis on 
which to undertake intervention and enforcement action, within at least some 
regulatory institutions. For Daniel is proposing to evaluate the accuracy of his 
hypothetical algorithm’s inferences about the riskiness and compliance status of 
food businesses through placing them in a very particular relationship with the 
professional judgements of human Local Authority officers. In his proposed trial, 
these assessors’ expectations are to form the standard of ‘sound judgement’ 
against which the accuracy and efficacy of algorithmic decision making processes 
will be measured. Only if an algorithm can be shown to form roughly the same 
expectations about the probable riskiness and compliance status of food 
businesses as would a human desktop assessor can it be said to be ‘working well’ 
or trusted to ‘make the right decision.’ In other words, the use of algorithmic 
processes to target regulatory intervention can only be authorised once they have 
been shown to resemble the professional judgements of a trusted or authorised 
elite of human decision makers. 
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Evaluating the efficacy of algorithms in terms of the precision with which they 
mimic expert human judgement does not seem to be unusual in contemporary 
algorithm development practices. A few weeks before my conversation with 
Daniel, I had spoken to a supermarket food safety executive who described 
testing the effectiveness of his company’s in-house risk mapping software 
through a similar process of validating its predictions about store risk scores 
against the ‘gut feelings’ of his staff. Meanwhile, Neyland and Möllers (2017) 
describe how developers of automated video surveillance systems evaluate their 
software’s performance in detecting suspicious objects by comparing its 
propensity to issue security alerts against that of experienced CCTV operators 
watching the same footage. This suggests that even as the advent of algorithmic 
systems displaces human professionals from the making and execution of key 
regulatory decisions, it may in many cases also be establishing new relationships 
between human professional judgement and algorithmic decision processes. 
Perhaps paradoxically, these relationships sometimes appear to cast algorithmic 
judgement as an approximation of, and even as subordinate to, that of the very 
human professionals who algorithmic systems are intended to supplant. In 
Daniel’s proposed trial, for instance, if an algorithm’s predictions about which 
businesses present an elevated risk of non-compliance differ substantially from 
those of authorised human professionals then it will be judged to be ‘performing 
poorly’. Only if the algorithm replicates the judgements of those professionals 
extremely closely will it stand a chance of being authorised to segment 
businesses into risk categories and to determine inspection frequencies in place 
of a human assessor. 
 
While the testing and evaluation of algorithms may be distinctly contemporary 
practices, the epistemic hierarchies implicit in these trials also evoke some 
curious historical parallels. In some respects, Daniel’s search for a mathematics 
which might replicate the operations of professional discrimination and 
judgement embodied in the decisions of Local Authority officers echoes the 
aspirations of eighteenth-century classical probability. This field of mathematics 
sought to convert the reasoning processes of esteemed subjects such as 
successful businessmen and distinguished magistrates into a ‘calculus of good 
sense’ which might be employed to guide the uninitiated towards wise courses of 
action (Daston 1988). Believing that the judgements of these ‘reasonable men’ 
expressed the best available estimates of the likelihood that, for instance, a given 
class of witness would testify truthfully in court or a business venture would be 
profitable, classical probabilists sought to derive mathematical descriptions of 
their deliberations. As such, the ultimate test of the classical probabilist’s calculus 
was its degree of accuracy in describing and predicting the conduct of these 
‘reasonable men’. As in Daniel’s proposed evaluation procedure for his risk 
segmentation algorithm, if a mathematical theory failed to predict the decisions 
of the ‘reasonable men’ then the theory – and not their judgment – was to be 
reassessed and reformulated. 
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Might these historical resonances provide some tentative insights into the 
possible implications of the apparent re-emergence of the aspiration to formalise 
the ‘good sense’ of an elite of authoritative human subjects into a mathematical 
calculus within the project of algorithmic regulation? As Lorraine Daston’s (1988) 
magisterial history of eighteenth-century classical probability makes clear, its 
intellectual programme was riven by a host of epistemological, methodological 
and even political controversies – some of which may also return to haunt 
contemporary practices of algorithmic design, testing and authorisation. Who 
should be included in, or excluded from, the charmed circle of distinguished 
subjects whose reasoning is to form the standard against which the performance 
of algorithms and the accuracy of their decisions must be measured? How might 
this approach to evaluating algorithms and authorising their judgements 
accommodate disagreement among its referent group of reasonable human 
subjects about the correct decision or course of action under certain 
circumstances? How closely must an algorithm’s judgements resemble those of 
this referent group in order for it to be performing ‘well enough’ that it may be 
authorised for use in real-world regulatory and enforcement practice? Indeed, 
how is this proximity to or distance from human judgement to be measured? To 
these historically familiar dilemmas might be added the questions of equity and 
fairness articulated by burgeoning social, legal and philosophical studies of 
algorithms. Might not a testing and evaluation process which defines a successful 
algorithm as one whose judgements mimic those of an elite group of authorised 
professionals produce algorithms which replicate this group’s biases, much as 
other studies have suggested that algorithmic decision making may reproduce 
the prejudices of designers and programmers? Such an outcome might present 
cause for serious concern if it were to perpetuate existing inequities in official 
decision making through ‘black boxing’ these biases within opaque, distributed 
and secretive computational infrastructures whose operations may be difficult to 
understand, question or contest. 
 
Although these concerns are familiar enough from other studies of algorithmic 
decision making, I would like to suggest tentatively that they manifest themselves 
in a specific form in this case due to the very particular relationship that Daniel’s 
suggested approach to evaluation establishes between the judgements of 
authorised professionals and those of algorithms. Taking the judgements of a 
professional elite to constitute the standard against which the performance of 
algorithms must be measured transforms many issues of both equity and 
accuracy in algorithmic decision making into questions about the composition, 
consistency and impartiality of the group of human subjects in whose image 
algorithmic systems are being made. As such, the practices and protocols through 
which new algorithms are tested and their performance is evaluated are likely to 
be bound up intimately with the reconfigurations of authority, power and 
expertise which attend the introduction of algorithmic decision making processes 
into new arenas of regulatory practice. Indeed, the politics and ethics of 
algorithmic regulation may be negotiated as much through the shifting relations 
and processes of reference and validation into which evaluation processes draw 
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human and algorithmic judgement as through the formalisation of mathematical 
rules, the authorisation of data collection or the replacement of human assessors 
with automated systems. After all, decisions about how, and against which 
standards and measures, the performance of algorithmic systems should be 
evaluated are likely to play a crucial role in determining which algorithms are 
eventually authorised to remake regulatory processes. It may, then, be crucially 
important to investigate what might be at stake in the choice between different 
methods of determining whether an algorithm is making the ‘right’ decisions. 
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EU data protection law falls short as desirable model for  
algorithmic regulation 
 
Lee A. Bygrave 
  
 
When canvassing various models for algorithmic regulation, EU data protection 
law is often posited as a rare example of such regulation operating in a legislative 
‘top-down’ form and as a possible model to emulate. The main reason inheres in 
the fact that EU data protection law provides a qualified right for a person not to 
be subject to fully automated decisions based on profiling and supplements this 
with a right to knowledge of the logic involved in such decisions. 
 
The right for a person not to be subject to fully automated decisions based on 
profiling currently inheres in Article 15 of the Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC). It is the first pan-European legislative norm aimed at regulating 
purely machine-based decisions in a data protection context. However, Article 15 
has been, in practice, a second class right in the EU data protection framework. It 
has not been the subject of litigation before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
or any national courts, bar those of Germany. Neither has it figured prominently 
in enforcement actions by national data protection authorities, nor in 
assessments of the adequacy of third countries’ data protection regimes with a 
view to regulating the flow of personal data to these countries. This is not to say 
that the right has been simply symbolic, but the occasions in which it has been 
invoked appear to have been few and far between. While it has inspired a 
proposal for a similar right to be incorporated in a modernised version of the 
Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,1 and also inspired various 
provisions of the 1997 Code of Practice on Protection of Workers’ Data drafted by 
the International Labour Office (ILO),2 it has not been widely replicated in the 
legal regimes of non-European countries. 
 
Several features of Article 15 undermine its traction. Firstly, it only applies if four 
cumulative conditions are met: (i) a decision must be made; (ii) the decision must 
have legal or otherwise significant effects on the person whom the decision 
targets; (iii) the decision must be based solely on automated data processing; and 
(iv) the data processed must be intended to evaluate certain personal aspects of 
the person targeted by the decision. This creates multiple hurdles for the 
application of Article 15. Secondly, a considerable degree of ambiguity inheres in 
                                                        
1 See Article 8(1) of the Draft modernised Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data [ETS 108], drawn up by the Council of Europe’s 
Ad hoc Committee on Data Protection (version of September 2016). See too the Council of 
Europe’s Guidelines on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data in the World of Big Data (adopted 23 January 2017; T-PD(2017)01), especially principles 7.1, 
7.3 and 7.4. 
2 See particularly principles 5.5, 5.6, 6.10 and 6.11. 
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these conditions and this ambiguity is exacerbated by lack of authoritative 
guidance on how they are to be understood. Thirdly, even if all of the conditions 
for its exercise are met, the right is subject to fairly broad and nebulous 
derogations. 
 
The General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679) will replace Directive 
95/46/EC (DPD) in May 2018. Article 22 of the Regulation maintains the essence 
of the right provided by DPD Article 15, albeit in a somewhat different form.3 
Article 22 reads as follows: 
 
Article 22 Automated individual decision-making, including profiling 
1. The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision 
based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which 
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her. 
 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the decision: (a) is necessary for 
entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data 
subject and a data controller; (b) is authorised by Union or 
Member State law to which the controller is subject and which 
also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests; or (c) is based on the 
data subject's explicit consent. 
 
3. In the cases referred to in points (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, the 
data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard 
the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at 
least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the 
controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the 
decision. 
 
4. Decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be based on special 
categories of personal data referred to in Article 9(1), unless point 
(a) or (g) of Article 9(2) apply and suitable measures to safeguard 
the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are 
in place. 
 
An important question is whether Article 22 will increase the power of EU data 
protection law over the generation and application of algorithms. My hunch is 
that it will not, for the following reasons. Firstly, Article 22, like its predecessor, 
still involves meeting multiple criteria. At the same time, Article 22 is afflicted to 
a greater degree than its predecessor by clumsy syntax that muddies its 
                                                        
3 A similar right has also been inserted in Article 11 of the Directive on data protection and law 
enforcement (Directive (EU) 2016/680). Traces of the right (or, more accurately, an associated 
duty) are further found in Article 6 of the Directive on Processing of Passenger Name Record Data 
(Directive (EU) 2016/681). 
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interpretation. This clumsiness extends even to the very nature of the right 
provided by Article 22(1), which masquerades as a right of a data subject but is, 
in my opinion, really laying down a qualified prohibition on a particular type of 
decisional process. 
 
Further, the derogations to the right in Article 22 have been, in one sense, 
broadened relative to the derogations under DPD Article 15. This means, for 
example, that automated decisions with the possibility of discriminatory effects, 
such as weblining, which are potentially hit by DPD Article 15, might be 
permitted under the new exception for consent. This exception is likely to lower 
the de facto level of protection for individuals, particularly in light of the relative 
strength of most individuals vis-à-vis banks, insurance companies, online service 
providers and many other businesses. However, the Regulation tightens the 
assessment of what is a freely given consent and what automated decisions are 
necessary for the purpose of entering into or performance of a contract (see 
Article 7(4) and recital 43). The traction of this tightening will rest on how 
strictly the necessity criterion is interpreted. 
 
The level of protection under Article 22 will also depend on what safeguards the 
data controller is obliged to put in place under Article 22(3). In this respect, there 
is uncertainty as to whether Article 22(3) provides a right of ex post explanation 
of automated decisions – uncertainty that also afflicts interpretation of Arts. 
14(2)(g) and 15(1)(h). However, there are aspects of Article 22(3) which offer a 
higher level of protection than under the DPD. According to Article 22(3), the 
data subject will always have the right to demand manual re-examination of a 
fully automated decision. This might take away the incentive for companies to 
acquire either a contract or consent from the data subject, as neither move will 
necessarily work as an exception to the right/prohibition in Article 22(1). Yet, if 
persons only rarely make use of their rights under Article 22(3), the overall effect 
of Article 22 on the automation of business might well end up being negligible – 
just as it has been with DPD Article 15. 
 
The level of protection under Article 22 will further depend on the specifics of 
member state legislation, especially in light of the derogations provided in Article 
22(2)(b) and, less directly, Article 22(4). At the same time, these derogations 
open up the possibility for significant divergence between national regulatory 
frameworks for automated decision making, thus undermining the harmonisation 
aims of the Regulation. 
 
Finally, the traction of Article 22 will likely be weakened by practical difficulties 
in implementing its requirements, particularly in respect of decisional systems 
that are extremely complex and opaque, including for the controller(s). Such 
systems are increasingly the rule rather than the exception. 
 
 
Lee A. Bygrave, Department of Private Law, University of Oslo. 
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Making sense of the European data protection law tradition 
 
Karen Yeung
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Although the UK Government Office for Science recently observed that identifying 
the right form of governance for artificial intelligence and for the use of digital 
data more widely is ‘not self-evident’ (Government Office for Science 2016), there 
is no doubt that contemporary data protection law will play a significant role.  
When academics and policymakers highlight the need for ‘algorithmic 
accountability’ their concern is not just with the software algorithms themselves, 
but the larger socio-technical systems in which those algorithms are embedded, 
including the data upon which those systems rely. Without data to sustain them, 
even the most sophisticated software algorithms are but hollow shells.  Yet the 
so-called ‘data deluge’ precipitated by the digital transformation of economically 
advanced societies, and the dynamic and highly complex ecology within which 
personal data (i.e. data pertaining to identifiable individuals) now flows, has 
placed contemporary data protection law under unprecedented strain.  Since its 
inception in the early 1970s, the contemporary western European data 
protection tradition has rested on the so-called ‘data protection principles (see 
Bygrave 2014: ch. 5). Recent reform of EU Data Protection Directive provided 
European lawmakers with an opportunity to revisit the foundations of European 
data protection law, given that these core principles were formulated long before 
the internet had been invented. Yet the opportunity for radical reform was 
passed over, so that, although the EU General Data Protection Regulation  (GDPR) 
introduces several regulatory innovations, the data protection principles 
continue to lie at its foundations. Hence Article 5 of the GDPR requires that 
personal data must be: 
 
(a) Processed fairly, lawfully and in a transparent manner in relation to the 
data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’) 
 
(b) Collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed for other purposes incompatible with those purposes 
(‘purpose limitation’); 
 
(c) Adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the 
purpose for which data is processed (‘data minimisation’); 
 
(d) Accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date (‘accuracy’); 
                                                        
 I am indebted to Lee Bygrave and Michael Veale for comments on earlier drafts. 
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(e) Kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects for no longer 
than is necessary for the purposes for which the persona data is 
processed (‘storage limitation’) 
 
(f) Processed in a way that ensures appropriate security of the personal 
data including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing 
and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate 
technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’) 
 
Yet many critics claim that the basic data protection principles, and the 
contemporary approach to European data protection law which they have 
spawned, is no longer fit for purpose. In order to evaluate this claim, we need to 
identify more clearly what purposes data protection law is designed to serve, and 
how European data protection law seeks to achieve those purposes. This paper 
aims to find answers to these questions, beginning first with the ‘how’ question 
by drawing insights from regulatory governance studies, before turning to the 
historical origins of modern European data protection in order to identify more 
clearly its point and purpose.1  This will place us in a better position to evaluate 
whether or not European data protection law is ‘fit for purpose’ in an age of 
ubiquitous computing, a technological environment which differs radically from 
that which prevailed when European data protection laws first emerged. 
 
How should we characterise the European approach to data protection? 
Based on his thorough and thoughtful survey of data protection laws (which he 
refers to as ‘data privacy law’) throughout Europe, Lee Bygrave (2014: 2–4) 
draws attention to several characteristic features: it is largely statutory as these 
statutes often take the form of ‘framework laws’ that tend to set down diffusely 
formulated, general rules for processing, and thus allowing for the subsequent 
development of more detailed rules as the need arises; they usually establish 
independent bodies to oversee their implementation (referred to as ‘data 
protection authorities’ or ‘privacy commissioners’), and these agencies often play 
a lead role in laying down how data privacy law is understood and applied, even 
in contexts where their views are only advisory. Although this is a very helpful 
starting point, for the regulatory governance scholar, it leaves many questions 
unanswered.  Accordingly, the following discussion proceeds on the basis that the 
EU data protection tradition can be understood as a regulatory governance 
regime (or ‘risk regulation regime’) which regulates the collection and processing 
of personal data (Gellert 2015), enabling us to draw upon insights from 
regulatory governance studies to provide a deeper, more extensive account of the 
core strategies adopted in contemporary EU data protection law.   
 
                                                        
1 I am indebted to Lee Bygrave, who, during the TELOS-CARR workshop on Algorithmic Regulation, 
questioned the validity of my claim that European data protection law adopted a ‘rights-based’ 
approach. Our ensuing discussion prompted me to write this paper. 
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A multi-instrument approach: command & control, the conferral of private rights  
and design-based techniques 
There are a wide range of instruments and techniques that policymakers can 
utilise in seeking to influence social behaviour in pursuit of their policy goals.  
The basic framework of the EU data protection regime rests primarily upon a 
classical or ‘command & control’ strategy, by specifying a set of core legal 
standards (rooted in the basic data protection principles) which must be 
complied with by those who wish to collect and process personal data. Failure to 
comply with these legal requirements renders the resulting data handling 
activities unlawful (DPD Articles 7–8) exposing data controllers to enforcement 
action by national data protection authorities which may result in the imposition 
of significant civil penalties.2  The new GDPR also introduces further prohibitions 
concerning the processing of children’s data (Article 8 GDPR), and introduces 
new legal obligations requiring controllers to notify data protection authorities 
and data subjects of ‘personal data breaches’ (Articles 31-32 GDPR). 
 
In addition to these basic prohibitions, the EU data protection regime also confers 
a set of rights on data subjects which data controllers are legally obliged to 
respect (and which data subjects may seek to enforce via the courts), including 
requirements that data controllers provide data subjects with basic information 
about the scope of data processing operations (DPD Articles 10-11), a series of 
access rights enabling the data subject to obtain knowledge of the logic involved 
in any automated processing of data concerning that individual (DPD Article 
12(a), and a qualified right to object to certain types of fully automated decision-
making processes (DPD Article 15(1).  The new GDPR will also introduce new 
data subject rights, including a right to data portability (Article 18 GDPR). One 
further significant innovation in the techniques introduced by the GDPR are new 
requirements of ‘data protection by design and by default’ which, in essence, 
impose legal obligations on data controllers to ‘hard wire’ data protection norms 
into information systems development (GDPR Article 23). From a theoretical 
perspective, these provisions are very significant in acknowledging that the 
protection of digital data may be secured through ‘design-based’ regulatory 
techniques (Yeung 2008, 2015) by seeking to ‘design in’ normative standards into 
the artefacts, infrastructure and environment in which the regulated activities 
take place. But whether or not these measures lead in practice to a significant 
improvement in the level and comprehensiveness of protection remains to be 
seen.   
 
In summary, EU data protection regime relies on several techniques and 
instruments, so that its overall approach is something of a cocktail, relying on a 
combination of conventional command & control techniques, typically applied by 
a public enforcement authority, but supplemented by a private rights regime and 
                                                        
2 Under the GDPR, the penalties have increased to a maximum of €1 million or 2 per cent of an 
enterprise’s annual turnover (per Article 79(6) GDPR).   
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recently bolstered by the introduction of ‘design-based’ strategies of protection 
(Morgan and Yeung 2007: ch. 2).     
 
A process-based approach that eschews ‘principles-based regulation’ 
Despite the multiplicity of regulatory strategies incorporated into the EU data 
protection regime, it is the legal prohibition on the collection and handling of 
personal data except in accordance with the data protection principles that 
provides the regime’s central anchoring point. Yet to understand how these core 
principles are expected to function, we need to consider how they have been 
formulated, drawing on insights from regulatory governance scholars who have 
highlighted the relative merits of different approaches. 
 
(a) Process vs outcome-based standards 
 Regulatory governance scholars often champion the benefits of 
performance or ‘outcome-based’ standards, which have become a well 
established feature of environmental regulation, in contrast to process-
based standards (Lodge and Wegrich 2012: 15). The advantages of 
outcome-based standards are claimed to lie in conferring considerable 
flexibility and freedom on regulated parties in determining how they can 
meet a specified policy objective most effectively, thus avoiding the 
bluntness of process-based standards which require regulated firms to 
comply with a set of specified processes. In addition, performance against 
outcome-based standards is typically assumed to be measurable (such as 
air quality) and might therefore be less prone to circumvention or 
avoidance strategies by regulated parties. Despite these claimed 
advantages, the EU data protection principles are formulated largely in 
process-based terms, seeking to restrict the processes by and through which 
personal data must be handled, rather than specifying a set of substantive 
values or outcomes which data controllers must comply with when dealing 
with personal data (Gellert 2015).3   
 
(b) Data protection principles rather than ‘principles-based regulation’ 
Another central preoccupation arising in the regulatory governance 
literature focuses on challenges associated with standard-setting, including 
problems encountered in drafting appropriate standards to govern the 
regulated activity. A contrast is often drawn between detailed rules, on the 
one hand, and broadly drafted ‘principles’ on the other (Ford 2010). In his 
                                                        
3 That said, some provisions of the GDPR specify substantive outcomes which must be achieved, 
sometimes in a fairly specific manner, such as Article 25(2) which provides that ‘The controller 
shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures for ensuring that, by default, 
only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. 
That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, 
the period of storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by 
default personal data are not made accessible without the individual’s intervention to an 
unspecified number of persons.’ In addition, national legislative provisions derogating from the 
core norms of the GDP are only permissible to the extent that they provide for a substantive 
outcome as specified in Article 23(1). 
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penetrating analysis of the ‘optimal precision of legal rules, Colin Diver 
observes that the success of a rule in effecting its purpose depends largely 
on several qualities: their transparency (whether the words have a well-
defined and universally accepted meaning within the relevant community), 
their accessibility (applicable to concrete situations without excessive 
difficulty or effort), and their congruence with the underlying policy 
objective (whether the substantive content of the message communicated 
by the words produces the desired behaviour). Diver (1983) argues that 
rule drafters are inevitably confronted by the need to make trade-offs 
between these values. For example, detailed, narrowly specified rules may 
be highly transparent and accessible but may fail to achieve the desired 
behavioural outcome, and although broadly drafted principles may be 
highly congruent with the rule-maker’s core policy objective, they often 
suffer from a lack of transparency and accessibility (Diver 1983). 
 
The European data protection principles are drafted in fairly broad and 
general terms, and thus more appropriately described as principles rather 
than detailed rules. This does not however, imply that the EU data 
protection regime can be appropriately understood as a regime of 
‘principles-based regulation’ (PBR). PBR refers to a regulatory approach 
that rose to prominence prior to the global financial crisis in the early to 
mid-2000s. Although PBR is not a term of art, it has been used by regulatory 
governance scholars to describe real-world regulatory regimes, which have 
tended not only to rely upon broadly based standards in preference to 
detailed rules, but also those regimes in which the standards themselves 
have also been largely outcome-based (rather than process-based) in their 
orientation (Black et al. 2007; Ford 2010). Accordingly, to describe the EU 
data protection regime as one of PBR would be to mischaracterise its 
approach, despite the central reliance on the EU data protection principles, 
due to the procedural nature of their demands, rather than prescribing a set 
of substantive outcomes or goals which data controllers are expected to 
meet in collecting and handling personal data. 
 
Enforcement by a public regulator supplemented by private enforcement 
One significant feature of the European data protection tradition is its reliance on 
independent administrative agencies, conventionally referred to as data 
protection authorities. Their primary responsibility is to oversee the operation of 
data protection legislation, including the task of investigating violations and 
taking enforcement action (including the imposition of financial penalties) 
against those found to be in breach. In addition to their broad discretionary 
powers of enforcement, data protection agencies also tend to wield considerable 
interpretive discretion, due to the relative dearth of established case law in which 
the courts have had an opportunity to clarify the scope and content of the 
legislative provisions (Bygrave 2014), and many of whom may promulgate 
administrative guidelines setting out how the agency proposes to interpret the 
law and exercise its enforcement discretion.  
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However, as noted above, EU data protection confers a number of legally 
enforceable rights on data subjects, which they can enforce against data 
controllers alleged to have violated these rights by taking court action seeking 
(among other things) an order that the infringement be terminated and the 
payment of damages. Yet in reality, although a majority of EU individuals are 
aware that they have some legal rights concerning their personal data (Hallinan 
et al. 2012), few are likely to be sufficiently motivated to initiate and maintain 
legal action against data controllers, particularly given the massive asymmetry in 
power, resources and sophistication of the giant digital platforms that now 
dominate our daily digital encounters. At the same time, although there are 
several grounds upon which a data controller may rely to demonstrate that the 
processing of personal data is lawful (a requirement of the ‘lawful, fairness and 
transparency’ principle), the consent of the data subject provides one such 
ground. Accordingly, by consenting to the collection, processing and transfer of 
personal data, data subjects may authorise controllers to use that data in more 
extensive and far-reaching ways than would otherwise be legally permitted. 
Having said that, because the purpose-limitation principle is unwaivable by data 
subjects, all data controllers are legally prohibited from processing data for 
purposes that are incompatible with the original purpose for which the data was 
collected. This does not, however, prevent data controllers from specifying the 
purpose of data collection in extremely broad terms, provided that those 
purposes are ‘legitimate’ and therefore fall within the controller’s natural ambit 
of activity (see Bygrave 2002: 339–40). It is arguably due to the conferral of a set 
of legal rights on data subjects, combined with their power to consent to the 
collection and processing of their personal data by the controller, that one might 
be inclined to describe the general approach of EU data protection as ‘rights 
based’ in orientation. To the extent that there are enforceable legal obligations 
that prevent data controllers from collecting and processing personal data in 
accordance as they wish, then this is undoubtedly true. But it is misleading to the 
extent that such a description suggests that individual data subjects occupy a 
central role in monitoring and enforcing compliance with the regime. 
 
Ex post vs ex ante regulation? 
While the preceding discussion highlights the procedural nature of the EU data 
protection principles, this does little to illuminate how those principles are 
intended to foster the regime’s underlying policy objectives. Although I seek to 
identify what, precisely, those policy objectives are in the next section, it is worth 
pausing to consider how the EU data protection regime would be understood in 
terms of a long-standing distinction, drawn primarily by economists, between ex 
ante and ex post approaches to regulation. Ex ante regulatory approaches 
typically rely on a system of prior approval, a technique which Anthony Ogus 
(1994:  214) observes can be traced back to the medieval guilds, that had 
effective monopolies over trades and crafts and to the issue of ‘patents of 
monopoly’ under royal prerogative, enabling certain individuals or groups to 
carry out trades or activities otherwise prohibited. In their modern guise, 
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regimes of this kind typically take the form of some kind of licensing regime, so 
that the regulatory activity is legally prohibited unless it is carried out by a valid 
licence holder, who has demonstrated to the relevant licensing authority that he 
or she has the requisite competence and capacities. Such approaches can be 
contrasted with ex post approaches, which typically entail the legal promulgation 
of certain minimum standards that the specified activity must meet, so that 
anyone who wishes to engage in that activity need not obtain prior permission, 
and may lawfully engage in it provided that the activity is undertaken in ways 
that meet the legislatively specified standards. 
 
Because advance authorisation is generally not required before data controllers 
can lawfully collect and process personal data, the contemporary EU data 
protection regime can be understood as resting on an ex post rather than an ex 
ante strategy of control. Having said that, there is an ongoing debate within data 
protection circles about the relative merits of a so-called ‘accountability’ 
approach to data protection, touted as an alternative to conventional reliance on 
the data protection principles. In particular, Cate, Cullen and Mayer-Schönberger 
(2014), authors of the OECD 2013 revised guidelines, argue that because notice 
and consent is no longer an effective mechanism to protect the informational 
privacy of data subjects, it would be preferable to shift responsibility from the 
shoulders of individuals, who are currently required to weigh up their own 
interests in protecting privacy and accessing digital resources, in favour of an 
approach that reduces (or even eliminates) the purpose limitation and use 
limitation principles, thereby enabling largely unrestricted collection of personal 
data, but placing more onerous legal responsibilities on data controllers when 
seeking to process that data, requiring them to undertake a more focused 
evaluation of the risks and benefits associated with particular uses to ensure that 
harm to individuals is minimised (Cate et al. 2014). Despite criticism of this 
approach, the GDPR places greater emphasis on the concept of accountability 
than its predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. 
 
Although this paper makes no attempt to evaluate the arguments put forward in 
support of this so-called accountability approach, its is a useful foil, highlighting 
the largely preventive approach reflected in the current structure and operation 
of the fair information processing principles. Hildebrandt (2015: 194) likens 
these principles to Odysseus’s strategy of tying himself and his crew to the mast 
to prevent them responding to Sirens’ call, thereby ‘enabling them to resist the 
overweaning temptation to gather more and more data and use it for more and 
more intrusive purposes and applications that will ultimately lead to downfall 
and destruction’. Accordingly, although EU data protection does not institute an 
ex ante licensing regime, the general approach it takes towards the regulated 
activity (that of collecting and processing personal data) is largely a preventative 
one, aimed at averting the unlimited collection and re-purposing of personal data 
in order to reduce the dangers that might arise if there were no restrictions on 
the collection and use of personal data. 
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What are the substantive goals of European data protection law? 
The preceding discussion draws attention to the largely preventive, process-
oriented approach reflected in the European data protection tradition. Armed 
with this understanding of how contemporary European data protection laws are 
intended to function, we can now turn our attention to their overarching 
purpose(s). At a pragmatic level, the EU data protection regime (and basic data 
protection principles upon which it rests) was animated by a concern to strike an 
appropriate balance between the use of data and the protection of the interests of 
those to whom the data relate, in order to establish a set of agreed principles for 
handling personal data so that disparity in national standards would not impede 
the free flow of personal data across national borders and impede digital 
innovation. But what exactly are the interests of data subjects that require 
protection? In this respect, identifying in more precise terms the point and 
purpose of EU data protection is surprisingly elusive. As Bygrave (2014: 117) 
observes: 
 
data privacy law has long been afflicted by absence of clarity over its 
aims and conceptual foundations’ and that this obscurity is reflected in 
the absence (in some privacy statutes) of the objects clauses formally 
specifying the interests that the legislation is intended to serve.   
 
Nor can the objectives of European data protection law be adequately expressed 
solely in terms of the protection of informational privacy, although there is no 
doubt that the protection of informational privacy constitutes one important 
values which it seeks to protect.  
 
In light of this lack of clarity, it is helpful to consider the historical origins of 
contemporary data protection law to identify the public anxieties that motivated 
their initial formulation. In providing a functional explanation for European data 
protection laws, Herbert Burkert (1981) articulates the ‘problems’ associated 
with data protection in terms of conflicts over the distribution of informational 
power wrought by new information communication technologies, which radically 
expanded the volume and speed of information that these technologies could 
handle, while also vastly expanding the number of individuals affected, and 
rendering temporal and spatial distance almost irrelevant in the acquisition and 
distribution of informational power. Drawing on Burkert’s observations, Gellert 
(2015) interprets the history of European data protection law as fundamentally 
rooted in seeking to regulate the ‘deployment of ICTs into society and, in 
particular, the data processing operations which they allow for’ which ‘put our 
freedoms at risk’.  This resonates with Bygrave’s observations that, in addition to 
privacy, there are a ‘range of other interests which … form part of the rationale 
and agenda of data privacy law’ including ‘personal autonomy, integrity and 
dignity’ and which he sums up as largely concerned with ‘achieving individual 
goals of self-realisation’ (Bygrave 2014: 119, citing Westin 1967). As Hildebrandt 
(2015: 191) puts it:  
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The reason we need data protection is that putting together data has 
huge implications for a number of rights and freedoms.  This is 
notably so when behavioural data are correlated.  
 
One might wonder then, why the legal protection of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms that are accorded special status within the western European 
constitutional tradition was not regarded as capable of providing sufficient 
protection? While the answer to this question is highly speculative, it may lie 
partly in the way in which it is the cumulative and aggregative effects of 
Information and Communication Technology over time and space that threaten a 
number of fundamental rights and individual freedoms. Even before the arrival of 
the internet, the nature of digital data, coupled with the computational power and 
processes that enabled large bureaucratic institutions to collect personal data 
and compile and integrate it with other digital data sets to build up detailed 
informational profiles on individual citizens through automated processes that 
were many orders of magnitude cheaper, faster, and scalable than the processes 
for surveilling and profiling individuals in a pre-digital age, were recognised in 
Europe as a potentially serious threat to the individual rights and freedoms that 
are essential in thriving liberal democratic orders. Since the emergence of 
modern computing and associated ICTs, the rapid growth of their power and 
sophistication have delivered extraordinary benefits, many of which have become 
readily available to the wider population following the ‘democratisation’ wrought 
by personal computing and the widespread availability and take-up of smart 
connected devices.  Indeed, contemporary life without the efficiency and 
convenience of the networked digital economy has become almost unthinkable. 
Yet these undeniable benefits can nevertheless serve to obscure the ways in 
which these technologies threaten to erode the social foundations upon which 
democratic freedom is rooted. Seen in this light, contemporary data protection 
law can be understood as analogous to environmental regulation, in seeking to 
protect to the democratic ‘commons’: rather than oriented towards protecting the 
natural, physical environment, it is oriented towards protecting the moral, 
democratic and cultural environment, by seeking to safeguard the collective 
social and cultural foundations which liberal democratic orders pre-suppose, and 
without which individual dignity, autonomy and self-development would not be 
possible. So understood, the need to establish a general regime of protection 
specifically concerned with limiting the collection and processing of personal 
data becomes more apparent. 
 
The difficulty is, however, that the ways in which the collection and processing of 
personal data may threaten the democratic commons and the freedom, autonomy 
and dignity of individuals is not intuitively obvious, either to data controllers or 
to data subjects, particularly given the process-driven, preventive orientation of 
contemporary European data protection laws. Although the strong commitment 
to data protection in Europe relative to many other advanced industrialised 
nations can be attributed to relatively recent first-hand experience of totalitarian 
oppression, the memory of this experience may be fading with the passage of 
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time, particularly in light of the efficiency and convenience associated with digital 
tools that the collection and processing of personal data makes possible (Bygrave 
2010). Although the EU constitutional framework, as amended by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, now recognises protection of personal data as a distinct, self-standing 
fundamental right (per Article 8 CFREU), thereby bolstering its normative 
significance, there is no instinctive or obvious connection between this right and 
the fundamental interests it protects. In contrast, other fundamental rights of a 
procedural nature, including the various procedural rights associated with the 
right to due process, including the right to a fair and public hearing, the right to a 
fair and impartial tribunal, and the right of an accused person to know the 
charges against her, have much more intuitive appeal, in that it is easy for 
ordinary citizens to recognise the vital interests which these procedural rights 
are concerned to protect. In contrast, the core interests and values which the 
fundamental right to data protection seeks to protect, and hence the normative 
and moral force with which we associate fundamental rights, are not so readily 
and instinctively evoked. Yet the right to data protection is justifiably accorded 
special status in view of its role in safeguarding the social foundations which 
make democratic society possible, and in which all individuals are treated with 
dignity and respect. As such, the complaint of Bert-Jaap Koops (2014) that 
European data protection law has failed to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of data 
controllers, who fail to recognise the substantive logic and rationale that 
underpin many data protection rules, can be understood. But it is far from self-
evident that a regulatory regime that is oriented around the substantive values 
and interests upon which the existing data protection regime is rooted would fare 
any better. Such an approach might be more readily comprehensible to both data 
controllers and data subjects in terms of its underlying justification, couched 
perhaps in terms of the ‘harms’ associated with the collection and processing of 
personal data, might have considerable appeal. The GDPR can be understood as 
taking steps in this direction, to the extent that it places explicit reliance on the 
role of so-called ‘data protection impact assessments’. But, for the time being at 
least, relying on these instruments to provide workable, legitimate and effective 
instruments to secure the protection of personal data that will offer clear and 
accessible guidance to data controllers concerning the content and limits of 
permissible data handling while nurturing public trust seems naively optimistic. 
 
Conclusion 
In order to understand the role and potential of European data protection law in 
securing the accountability of algorithmic systems which rely on the processing 
of personal data, it is necessary to identify how these laws are intended to 
operate, and what they are intended to do. This analysis has highlighted several 
features of the European legal regime. In particular, I have suggested that its 
preventive, process-oriented nature, which seeks to restrict the way in which 
personal data is collected and processed in order to prevent excessive ‘data 
power’ accumulating in the hands of data controllers, makes it difficult for both 
data subjects and data controllers to intuitively recognise the underlying 
substantive rights, interests and values which the regime is ultimately aimed at 
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protecting. Although placing greater emphasis on data processing ‘harm’ 
represents movement towards a more substantive approach, whether or not this 
will serve to win public hearts and minds by enabling them to grasp the 
importance of the need to protect the social foundations of democratic orders 
which these regimes seek to safeguard is far from guaranteed. 
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